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Abstract: 
We investigate whether business group affiliation affects tax avoidance in a global setting. The 
business group structure could facilitate tax avoidance by allowing the ultimate owner to transfer 
resources and income across group firms. However, nontax costs such as price discounts by 
minority shareholders and agency costs could deter tax avoidance. Overall, we find evidence that 
business group firms exhibit greater tax avoidance than stand-alone firms, but the effect is 
restricted to firms in countries with developed economies where the nontax costs are lower. In 
contrast, we find that business group firms exhibit lower tax avoidance in emerging market 
countries, where the nontax costs are higher. In supplemental tests we find that the positive 
relation between business group affiliation and tax avoidance is driven by business groups in 
developed market countries with code law legal systems. Thus, our evidence suggests that 
common law systems also deter tax avoidance by business group firms. While our findings are 
not conclusive, they provide evidence regarding how the impact of organizational structure on 
tax avoidance differs across countries. 
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1. Introduction 
A considerable literature has developed to identify factors that impact the extent of a 
firm’s tax avoidance.1 One such factor is the ownership structure of the firm. Examples include 
studies of founding families (Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin, 2010) and dual-class shares 
(McGuire, Wang, and Wilson, 2014). In this study we extend this literature to a global setting by 
using an international sample from 38 countries, including 22 developed and 16 emerging 
economies. Specifically, we focus on the business group, one of the most common organizational 
forms internationally and examine whether business group firms exhibit a greater, or lesser 
degree of tax avoidance than stand-alone firms. We also consider whether the development stage 
of a country’s economy differentially affects the impact of business group affiliation on the 
extent of the firm’s tax avoidance.  
The business group as an organizational form is particularly interesting because it is one 
of the most common and heavily researched forms around the world. While the literature has 
documented that business groups can increase firm value by creating an internal capital market, 
it is not known whether the ability to transfer resources between member firms is used to shift 
income between firms to reduce their tax liability. In addition, business group firms are likely to 
incur non-tax costs such as price discounts by minority shareholders and agency costs similar to 
those documented in the U.S. for family controlled firms and dual-class firms, respectively. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether firms affiliated with a business group would exhibit lower 
degrees of tax avoidance than stand-alone firms in the presence of these additional costs.  
																																								 																				
1 Examples include CEO characteristics (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010), CEO compensation (Rego and 
Wilson 2012), monitoring from labor unions (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013) and hedge funds (Cheng, Huang, Li 
and Stanfield 2012), and country characteristics (Atwood, Drake, Myers and Myers 2012).   
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The business group ownership structure is prevalent around the world and is notable for 
the separation of ownership from control through pyramidal ownership structure and cross-
shareholding (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 2002; Bae, Kang and Kim 2002; Joh 2003 and 
Baek, Kang, and Lee 2006).2 Business groups generally include several legally independent ﬁrms 
that are connected via an ownership structure in which an ultimate owner is the controlling 
shareholder for a set of companies that are, in turn, the controlling shareholders of other firms.3  
A key advantage of the business group structure is that it creates an internal capital 
market that facilitates the transfer of capital between group affiliated firms to overcome 
imperfect capital markets, especially in emerging market countries (e.g., Khanna and Rivkin 
2001, Mahmood and Mitchell 2004, Chang, Chung and Mahmood. 2006). While prior literature 
has focused on its ability to facilitate transfers of capital for investment, the business group 
structure could also enable ultimate owners to allocate resources across units to take advantage 
of favorable tax provisions such as tax credits for specific types of investments, and low tax 
rates. The common (and often centralized) control by ultimate owners could also allow group 
member firms to shift taxable income, through transfer pricing or resource allocation, to 
minimize the tax liability of business group firms.  
However, prior research has documented evidence that the extent of tax avoidance is 
limited by nontax costs associated with a firm’s organizational form. Chen et al. (2010) find that 
family controlled U.S. firms exhibit lower degrees of tax avoidance and attribute this result to the 
concern of minority shareholders that the founding family will use their control to extract rents. 
																																								 																				
2 “Pyramidal ownership structure is defined as an entity whose ownership structure displays a top-down chain of 
control. In such a structure, the ultimate owners are located at the apex and what follows below are successive layers 
of firms. A direct result of this pyramidal ownership structure is a separation of ultimate owners' actual ownership 
and control in firms located at the lower part of the pyramid structure.” (Ariffin 2009, p.1) 
3 One limitation of our study is that our sample only consists of corporations, and excludes pass-through entities. We 
recognize that the pass-through entities are used to avoid taxation (Luna and Murray 2010), and those effects will 
not be reflected in our findings. 
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Business groups face similar concerns that the ultimate owner will expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders. Cognizant of this threat, minority shareholders discount the price of their 
shares, giving rise to a loss in value of the business group firm.4 Thus, business group firms are 
likely to face similar costs from minority shareholders and forego tax-planning opportunities to 
avoid the appearance of wealth expropriation.  
In addition, business groups are characterized by a separation of cash flow rights from 
control rights. McGuire, Wang and Wilson (2014) provide evidence that this separation incurs 
agency costs that increase the firm’s tax rate because firm managers are more entrenched and 
thereby have lower incentives to exert effort to identify tax-planning opportunities. Thus, for 
business groups, the lower degree of cash flow rights allocated to group-affiliated firms could 
exacerbate the underlying agency problem, thereby leading to higher effective tax rates or lower 
tax avoidance. 
In summary, we expect business group affiliation to facilitate tax avoidance through the 
ability of the ultimate owner to shift resources to take advantage of favorable tax laws. However, 
the tax avoidance activities of business group firms are tempered by the aforementioned non-tax 
costs. Therefore, the question of whether the business group organizational structure is, on 
average, associated with greater or less tax avoidance is ultimately an empirical question. 
While nontax costs are generally not observable, we expect them to vary systematically 
with the development of the country’s capital markets. In emerging market countries with less 
developed capital markets and regulatory environments, the risk of expropriation by controlling 
shareholders is high. Khanna and Rivkin (2001), Khanna and Palepu (2000), Khanna and Yafeh 
																																								 																				
4 Studies of business groups in India and Korea find that minority shareholders use market or legal means to protect 
their interests, thereby passing the value loss from managerial expropriation back to the ultimate owner (Bertrand, 
Mehta and Mullainathan 2002, Bae, Kang and Kim 2002; Joh 2003; Baek, Kang, and Lee 2006; and Kim and Yi 
2006). 
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(2005), and Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) argue that in emerging markets business groups use 
their reputation as a bonding mechanism to reduce the price discount by minority shareholders. 
This suggests that the nontax cost to the ultimate owner that arises from minority price discount 
is greater in emerging markets than in developed markets. Emerging markets are also 
characterized by less developed labor markets and less efficient information systems (e.g., 
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; 
and Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006). This combination increases the nontax cost to the 
ultimate owner of monitoring the activities of group firm managers and their ability to identify 
tax-planning opportunities. In addition, Gallemore and Labro (2015) show that lower-quality 
information reduces managers’ ability and opportunities to identify tax-planning opportunities.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the nontax costs associated with the business 
group form are likely to be greater in emerging market countries than in developed market 
countries. Thus, we expect the impact of the business group on tax avoidance to differ across 
countries, depending on the development stage of a country’s economy. Specifically, relative to 
stand-alone firms, we expect business group firms to exhibit higher degrees of tax avoidance in 
developed markets where the nontax costs are relatively low than in emerging markets where the 
nontax costs are relatively high. 
To test the relation between business group affiliation and tax avoidance, we construct an 
international sample of 3,829 group-affiliated non-U.S. firms over the period of 2000–2013 from 
38 countries. Following Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012), we measure the extent of a 
firm’s tax avoidance by the difference between the country’s statutory corporate tax rate and the 
firm’s cash effective tax rate. We use an index constructed by Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) to classify a country as an emerging market or a developed market and use 
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two variations of our test variable, i.e., business group affiliation.  The first is a dichotomous 
variable that indicates whether the firm is part of a business group and the second indicates 
whether the firm is part of a large business group that has more than three member firms.  
For the full sample, we find that group-affiliated firms display a greater degree of tax 
avoidance (a lower effective tax rate) than stand-alone firms. When we split the sample between 
developed and emerging market countries, we find that in developed countries where nontax 
costs are relatively low, business group firms demonstrate a greater degree of tax avoidance than 
stand-alone firms. In contrast, in emerging market countries where nontax costs are relatively 
high, we find that business group firms exhibit a lower degree of tax avoidance than stand-alone 
firms. These results indicate that the impact of the business group ownership structure on tax 
avoidance differs across countries and reinforces the importance of nontax costs as determinants 
of tax avoidance in an international context.  
However, when we replace country indicator variables with country-level control 
variables the coefficient on the group indicator variable in the emerging market sample is not 
significant. This is partially due to the loss of 25% of the emerging market sample arising from 
data considerations and could also be attributed to the (time-variant) country-level control 
variables being correlated with cross-country differences in nontax costs within emerging 
markets. In contrast, we find that the positive relation between group affiliation and tax 
avoidance in the developed market sample is robust to using country-level controls. 
We also find that the greater degree of tax avoidance by business group firms in 
developed markets is sensitive to the exclusion of Japan. Japan firms constitute approximately 
26% of our full sample and 42% of the developed market sample. When we exclude Japan the 
positive coefficients on the business group indicator variable in the full sample and developed 
7	
	
market samples are not significant. One possible explanation is that Japan has a code, or civil law 
legal system. A code law system generally provides minority investors with a lower degree of 
legal protection than a common law system and could therefore provide ultimate owners with a 
greater degree of flexibility to shift resources to reduce group firm tax payments. To provide 
evidence on this issue, we estimate the relation between group affiliation and tax avoidance for 
firms in developed market, code law countries excluding Japan. We find a significantly positive 
association, which is consistent with the code law legal system allowing ultimate owners to shift 
resources and income in order to reduce tax payments of group firms. 
Overall, our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of tax avoidance by 
showing that the organizational structure of the firm combines with country level characteristics 
to influence the extent of a firm’s tax avoidance. Prior studies on tax avoidance have focused on 
large multinational U.S. corporations (Rego 2003), including studies linking tax avoidance to 
ownership structure (Chen, et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2014). We extend the findings of Atwood 
et al. (2012), who examine the relations between country-level characteristics and tax avoidance, 
by providing evidence regarding the impact of a common organizational structure, i.e., business 
group, on tax avoidance and how it varies across country characteristics. We also extend the 
findings of Luna and Murray (2010) who examine how state tax rates affect the decision to 
structure a business as a corporation or a pass-through entity in the U.S., by examining the 
impact of organizational structure on tax avoidance across countries.  
 Our study also extends the literature on how country-specific conditions influence the 
economic effects of the business group structure. Mahmood and Mitchell (2004) use cross-
country tests to document that the benefits associated with business group affiliation such as the 
increased access to internal financing and a greater degree of innovation, and Masulis et al. 
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(2011) illustrate that family-controlled business group structure emerges in order to maintain 
control, as well as to circumvent external financing constraints. Our study provides evidence that 
country-level institutional characteristics also impact the tax advantages associated with the 
business group form. 
 
2. Business Groups and Tax Avoidance 
  An important strand of literature focuses on the trade-off between nontax costs and cash 
tax savings (e.g., Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson 1990). In theory, firms choose an optimal level 
of tax avoidance that balances tax savings against the associated nontax costs. Thus, while firms 
generally attempt to take advantage of favorable tax provisions, their ability to do so is limited 
by the potential costs, or frictions from taking such actions. As a result, the ability of a firm to 
take advantage of tax planning opportunities depends on the nature of their product markets, 
production functions, and organizational structure.5  
Organizational and ownership structures that allow firms to transfer resources and 
income between taxable units should provide more tax planning opportunities. One such 
ownership structure is the business group. Khanna and Rivkin (2001, p. 47) describe business 
groups as “a set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound together by a 
constellation of formal and informal ties, and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.” A 
business group typically has a pyramidal structure whereby an ultimate owner controls a set of 
firms, each of which controls another set of firms that creates the wedge between ownership and 
control rights. This is a fairly common structure that allows capital to flow more efficiently 
																																								 																				
5 For example, firms that rely on innovation to generate value are better able to take advantage of R&D tax credits 
and firms whose values are tied to intellectual property rights are better able to shift incomes from high-tax to low-
tax jurisdictions. This suggests that a firm’s tax rate depends on its ability to shift income and resources between 
economic activities or entities. 
9	
	
through different organizations, leading to greater and more effective investments in assets and 
R&D, particularly when external capital and input markets are not well developed (Almeida and 
Wofenzen 2006, Masulis et al. 2011, Belenzon and Berkovitz 2010). The control rights of the 
ultimate owner should also allow her to shift resources among firms affiliated with a business 
group to take advantage of tax saving opportunities. For example, the owner can direct R&D 
resources to units that can take full advantage of R&D tax credits or shift income to units that 
pay lower tax rates. Thus, the business group structure should facilitate the ability of the 
affiliates to reduce the overall tax payments of member firms. 
On the other hand, prior studies illustrate that this ownership structure creates a wedge 
between voting rights (control) and cash flow rights (ownership). This characteristic can increase 
costs of tax avoidance in two ways. The first is that the separation of control from cash flow 
rights incentivizes the ultimate owner to shift resources from organizations for which the owner 
has low cash flow rights (i.e., those located at the bottom of the pyramid) to organizations for 
which the owner has high cash flow rights (i.e., those located at the top of the pyramid). This 
process, referred to as “tunneling,” allows the ultimate owner to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders (Bae, Kang, and Kim 2002, Joh 2003, Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 
2002, Baek, Kang, and Lee 2006). Anticipating these actions, minority investors’ price-protect 
themselves from the expropriation by reducing the value to the firm generating a “minority price 
discount”. 
The potential market discount associated with the perception that business group firms 
are transferring resources to reduce their tax payments could lead group firms to forego tax-
planning opportunities. Stated another way, group affiliated firms may pass up tax planning 
activities to convey to outside investors a credible signal that they do not engage in rent 
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extraction through tax avoidance. In this respect, business group affiliation could serve as a 
bonding mechanism that helps group affiliated firms to avoid the potential loss in value from 
minority discounts and reputation losses. This is consistent with the findings reported by Chen et 
al. (2010), who identify a sample of founding family-run firms in the U.S. and compare their 
cash effective tax rates against a comparable sample of non-family-run firms. They find that 
family-run firms pay higher cash effective tax rates than their non-family-run counterparts and 
attribute this result to family-run firms foregoing tax savings in order to avoid the potential 
minority shareholder discount from family rent-seeking activities.  
A second cost is an effort aversion problem in the standard agency model (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Identifying and exploiting tax savings takes considerable managerial effort and 
expertise. Thus, managers need to be incentivized in order to spend the effort and resources 
necessary to exploit tax saving opportunities. The separation of control and cash flow rights, 
which is a salient characteristic of the business group form, exacerbates this problem by reducing 
the proportion of the tax savings flowing to the management of group member firms relative to 
stand-alone firms. McGuire et al. (2014) provide evidence that the separation of control and cash 
flow rights influences the degree of tax avoidance by examining the relative tax avoidance of 
dual-class versus single-class ownership firms. They argue that the divergence between control 
and ownership associated with dual-class ownership structures increases the agency problem and 
reduces managerial incentives to exert effort to identify tax-saving opportunities. Consistent with 
this view, McGuire et al. (2014) find that dual-share firms exhibit a lower degree of tax 
avoidance than comparable single-class firms, and conclude that the separation of ownership 
from control leads to a lower level of tax avoidance.  
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Because the incremental degree of tax avoidance associated with the business group 
organizational form depends on the extent of the non-tax costs, cross-country differences in these 
costs should influence the trade-off that determines a firm’s optimal tax planning and strategy. 
One such difference is the degree of the development of a country’s economic system. 
Emerging markets are generally characterized by having less well developed information 
systems and regulatory regimes. This creates additional opportunities for tunneling activities and 
increases the concerns that ultimate owners will use their voting rights to extract rents from 
minority shareholders via the complex ownership structure of the business group. Consistent 
with this view, there is empirical evidence of minority price discounts in emerging market 
countries (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 2002, Bae, Kang and Kim 2002; Joh 2003; Baek, 
Kang, and Lee 2006; and Kim and Yi 2006).   
The weaker regulatory regime and information environment in the emerging market 
countries also exacerbate the underlying agency problem by making it more difficult (costly) for 
ultimate owners to monitor managerial actions of group firms. This issue is also likely to be 
especially problematic with developing highly technical tax avoidance strategies. Managers are 
generally selected based on their general management skills or technical knowledge for their 
specific business, as opposed to tax expertise. As a result, absent direct incentives under which 
they receive a large proportion of the tax savings, they are more likely to focus on tax 
compliance, as opposed to expending costly effort in developing tax avoidance strategies. Cheng 
et al. (2012) provide evidence consistent with this view by examining the impact of hedge fund 
activism on tax avoidance. They find that hedge fund intervention, particularly by hedge funds 
with specific tax expertise, leads to reduction in firm cash effective tax rates. In addition, the 
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poor internal information environment in emerging market economies increases the difficulty 
(cost) of identifying tax-planning opportunities (Gallemore and Labro 2015).  
 The foregoing discussion leads to the following research questions. First, do ultimate 
owners use the financial flexibility of the business group ownership structure to reduce the tax 
liability of group firms? Second, if so, to what degree is the additional tax avoidance offset by 
the nontax costs associated with the business group structure? To address these questions, we 
compare the tax avoidance of firms affiliated with business groups to the tax avoidance 
comparable stand-alone firms for the full sample, and then, separately, evaluate the comparison 
for emerging market countries, where the nontax costs are expected to be high, and for 
developed market countries, where the nontax costs are expected to be relatively low. 
 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample and descriptive statistics 
We construct our sample from the intersection of Compustat Global (for accounting data) 
and the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Osiris database and the Worldscope database (for ownership-
related data). BvD collects ownership information from companies, government agencies or 
associated information providers, such as company registrars of national statistical offices, credit 
registries, stock exchanges, and regulatory filings. Our sample period covers the 14-year period 
of 2000–2013. We identify business groups using detailed firm ownership links from the Osiris 
and Worldscope databases, and merge business group data with accounting data from the 
Compusat Global database. We define a business group as a group where two or more listed 
firms are controlled by the same ultimate controlling owner. Control is typically enhanced 
through ownership pyramids, cross-shareholdings and to a lesser extent dual class shares. To 
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identify whether a firm has an ultimate controlling owner, we use annual Osiris DVD updates 
from 2002 through 2013, supplemented by Worldscope.6 Osiris tracks control by computing 
voting rights rather than cash flow rights and identifies a shareholder of a firm to be the ultimate 
owner at a given threshold if that shareholder’s stake in the firm exceeds that threshold directly 
or he controls it via a control chain whose links all exceed that threshold. A shareholder might be 
a corporation, an individual, a family, a foundation, or a government. In tracing control, Osiris 
presets the threshold of either 25% or 50% and we choose a 25% threshold.7 We supplement the 
Osiris ownership information by manually gathering data on business group attributes from 
several information sources, including LexisNexis (e.g., the Major Companies Database), 
Factiva (e.g., the Taiwan Economic Journal database of Asian companies), stock exchange and 
securities regulator websites (in Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
and Sri Lanka), directly from company annual reports available in Standard and Poor’s Mergent 
Online database or other online sources (providing a substantial portion of the ownership data 
collected for firms in Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Thailand), 
and other online sources, such as Dun and Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom and Thomson 
Reuters’ OneSource. 
To ensure that our results are not driven by prior findings with regard to U.S. 
multinationals, we exclude business groups with U.S. ultimate owners. In addition, because 
governments receive tax payments, rather than making tax payments, we exclude business 
groups with governmental bodies, or agencies, as ultimate owners. Data requirements limit our 
study to publicly traded corporations. While this limits the firms included in business groups by 
excluding private firms, it ensures that all firms in the sample are subject to corporate taxes. 
																																								 																				
6 We extrapolate the ownership structure in 2000 and 2001 based on the 2002 ownership data and validate it by 
using Worldscope and the ownership data constructed by Faccio and Lang (2002). 
7 We have used various thresholds to define the ultimate owner. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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We begin with all firm-year observations having sufficient data in the Compustat Global 
database to compute the variables used in our empirical analyses and merge them with the 
business group membership data from the Osiris database. Next, we apply a matching procedure 
to control for observable differences between group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms.8	 To 
address this issue, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) methodology (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002). Details regarding the propensity matching procedure can be found in Appendix C.  
We classify countries as being in an emerging or developed market based on the 2015 
index constructed by MSCI, an investor research and analysis firm. According to MSCI, 
emerging market countries have lower degrees of openness to foreign ownership, lower capital 
inflows/outflows, lower efficiency of operational framework, and less stable institutional 
framework. Thus, emerging market countries generally have less developed capital markets with 
limited access to foreign capital. The “efficiency of operational framework” reflects the “level of 
advancement of the legal and regulatory framework governing the financial market,” and the 
stability of institutional framework includes the “basic institutional principles such as the rule of 
law and its enforcement.”  
Our measure of tax avoidance follows Atwood et al. (2012) as the reduction in explicit 
taxes paid relative to the country’s statutory rate. Specifically, tax avoidance (TaxAvoid) for ﬁrm 
i in year t is defined as follows:  
TaxAvoidit	 =	 (!"#$%∗!)!"! !"#!"!!!!!!!! !"#$%!"!!!! 																																																																	(2) 
 
where: 
PTEBX	 =	 pre-tax earnings before exceptional items (PI–XI or Item 21–Item 57);9	
																																								 																				
8 Business groups could engage in “winner-picking” by identifying profitable stand-alone firms (Belenzon and 
Berkovitz 2010). 
9 Item numbers reference the Compustat Global FTP database. 
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𝜌	 =	 home-country statutory corporate income tax rate;10 and	
CTP	 =	 current taxes paid (TX–the change in TXP or Item 24–the change in Item 1000).11	
 
Our measure indicates that a higher value of TaxAvoid reflects the amount of actual tax paid 
below the amount of statutory corporate tax to be paid under the current tax law.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides the number of firms and firm-year observations for stand-
alone firms and group-affiliated firms by country. The table also provides the market 
classification for each country. Japan is the country that has the largest representation with 
27.12% (23.40%) of the stand-alone (group-affiliated) firm-year observations. 
Panel B of Table 1 provides data regarding the ownership by the ultimate owner (at the 
firm level) and the number of firms in each business group. We impose a minimum ownership of 
25%. The mean (median) ownership is 67% (60%).  The mean (median) number of affiliates in a 
business group is 4 (2) firms. However, our sample is highly skewed with several large business 
groups. At the firm level, which is our level of analysis, larger business groups have greater 
representation, which leads to a mean (median) of 8 (3) firms from each business group. 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
Table 2 presents the data separated by the business-group ownership structure. Panel A of 
Table 2 reports the distribution of firms by industry (Campbell 1996). We find a relatively high 
representation of firms in the Services and Leisure industries. Panel B of Table 2 presents the 
																																								 																				
10 We hand-collected these statutory rates from a KPMG LLP online summary, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP’s online information, and Coopers & Lybrand LLP’s worldwide tax summary guides. 
11 When current tax expense (txc) is missing, we replace it with total tax expense less deferred taxes (txt-
txdI) when available. We delete observations where current tax expense (txc) is missing and either total 
tax expense (txt) or deferred taxes (txdI) is missing. 
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summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis separately for stand-alone firms and 
group-affiliated firms.12 We find that the level of tax avoidance, captured by TaxAvoid, is higher 
for group-afﬁliated ﬁrms (median = 8.2%) than for stand-alone firms (median = 7.7%). Though 
only suggestive of the underlying relation, this univariate finding is in line with the view that 
group-affiliated firms tend to engage in higher levels of tax avoidance than stand-alone firms. 
 
3.2. Empirical model 
We use the following baseline model to test for the effect of the group affiliation on tax 
avoidance conditional on a country’s economic development: 
TaxAvoidit+1 = β0 + β1Groupit + ΣβnZit + αYear + γIndustry + ηCountry + ε.   (3)  
where TaxAvoidit+1 is the tax avoidance measure from Equation (2); and Groupit is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the ﬁrm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise; Zit is a vector 
of firm-level controls; and αYear, γIndustry, and ηCountry are indicator variables for the year, Fama-
French 48 industry, and country, respectively. Following Atwood et al. (2012), we include a set 
of firm-level controls, including pre-tax return on assets [Pre-Tax ROA], ﬁrm size [LogSize], 
cash size [CashSize], research and development expenditures [R&D], capital structure [Lev], 
sales growth [SalesGrowth], asset mix [CapInt and InvInt], firm age [FirmAge] and an indicator 
variable for multinational operations [Multi]. We also include variables representing other 
ownership structure characteristics of firms that include the dual-class structure [Dual] and the 
family ownership [FamilyFirm] (e.g., Chen et al. [2010]; McGuire et al. [2014]). 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Full Sample Test 
																																								 																				
12 Note that the propensity score matching was based on	the values of variables as of the IPO date. We use firm-level 
controls in our regressions to control for differences across samples in the current values of the financial variables. 
17	
	
We first examine the general relation between business groups and tax avoidance. 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results using OLS estimation. The coefficient on the business 
group indicator variable (0.003) is significantly positive (t-statistic = 2.21). This result suggests 
that, on average, business group firms are able to avoid a greater amount of taxes than stand-
alone firms and that the expected cash tax savings from tax planning opportunities provided by 
the business group structure exceed the nontax costs associated therewith. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 present results using a two-stage instrumental variable 
approach. We estimate the first-stage model by using the Compustast Global universe and then 
use our sample firm-year observations for the second-stage estimation. In the first stage, group 
membership is the dependent variable and the control variables include the set of explanatory 
variables from the tax avoidance regression and a set of instruments to address the self-selection 
issue. We follow prior studies and use two identification strategies in selecting a set of 
instruments that are predicted to be associated with group affiliation, but not with the 
unexplained components of tax avoidance (Belenzon and Berkovitz 2010; Masulis et al. 2015).  
We use a firm-level instrument, Idiosyncratic Risk, and three separate industry-level 
(three-digit SIC) instruments capturing R&D intensity [RD_Intensity], the level of dependence 
upon external capital [ExternalFinance] and firms’ market power [LernerIndex] (Belenzon and 
Berkovitz 2010). Idiosyncratic risk is a popular instrument for ownership structure in prior 
studies (e.g., Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999; Villalonga and Amit 2006 and; Masulis et 
al. 2015). Idiosyncratic risk could be related to the likelihood of group membership because a 
controlling party can diversify their exposure to firms with high firm-specific risk, but should not 
be directly related to a firm’s tax avoidance (Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams 2015).  
Business groups are more likely to occur in R&D-intensive industries, since groups facilitate 
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research and development projects through their ability to provide their afﬁliates with lower cost 
financing. Groups are also expected to be more prevalent in industries with higher dependence 
on external financing. We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and rank industries according to 
their dependence on external financing, using U.S. ﬁrms from Compustat America.13 Using the 
U.S. firms in our setting is advantageous because business groups are rare in the United States 
due to higher tax and regulatory costs of maintaining a business group (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Masulis et al. 2015). We compute External Finance Dependence as the ratio of capital 
expenditures minus cash ﬂow from operations to capital expenditures.14 We also employ the 
Lerner index as a proxy for the firms’ market power, e.g., the ability of a firm to profitably raise 
the market price of a good or service over marginal cost.  Finally, group membership can be 
related to historical market conditions around a firm’s listing date. Stand-alone firms are more 
likely to go public when capital market conditions are favorable (to raise more cash proceed 
from external capital markets and finance their investment projects) than affiliates (firms that 
belong to the business group), given that the affiliates can receive funding from other affiliates 
within the same group or the group headquarters for their investment projects (Masulis et al. 
2011). We employ the cumulative return on the domestic stock market index in the listing year 
of each firm as an instrument (Index Return at Listing).  
To validate our choice of instruments we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and 
conduct weak instrument identification and Hausman specification tests. The partial R2 of the 
																																								 																				
13 Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that using U.S. ﬁrms is advantageous in three ways: (i) Because U.S. 
ﬁrms face low market frictions in attaining external financing, the amount of external financing used by 
U.S. companies is a strong proxy for their demand for external ﬁnance. (ii) Disclosure requirements imply 
that data on external ﬁnancing are wide-ranging. (iii) While using U.S. industry data is exogenous to our 
sample ﬁrms across countries, it is likely that an industry’s dependence on external funds in the United 
States is a reasonable proxy for external dependence in our sample countries. 
14 When we use the ratio of the net amount of equity issued to capital expenditures as a proxy for the level 
of the external capital dependence, the results are qualitatively the same. 
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first stage regression is 9.2% and partial F is 141.12. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 35.28, 
which exceeds the 10% (25%) critical value of 26.87 (15.09) based on Stock and Yogo (2005). 
Overall, the results suggest that the instrument passes the weak instrument tests by explaining a 
significant amount of the GROUP. The Hausman test yields a Wu-Hausman F value of 3.77 (p  < 
0.05). This test supports the contention that the instrumental variable improves the specification 
over the OLS estimation. 
The results in Column 3 of Table 3, though slightly weaker, are generally consistent with 
the OLS estimation. The coefficient for the probability of group affiliation is significantly 
positively associated with tax avoidance (t-statistic = 1.96). Thus the two-stage model lends 
further support to the conclusion that group-affiliated firms exhibit a greater degree of tax 
avoidance than stand-alone firms. 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
4.2. Developed vs. Emerging Markets 
To provide additional insight into the trade-off between the tax avoidance flexibility and 
nontax costs of the business group ownership structure, we separately examine the impact of the 
business group structure on tax avoidance for countries with developed markets and countries 
with emerging markets. We present the OLS results in Table 4. We report the results for the tests 
on our developed market country sample in column (1) and our emerging market country sample 
in column (2).  
The results for the developed market countries are stronger than the results for the full 
sample reported in Table 3. The coefficient on the business group indicator variable increases 
from 0.003 for the full sample to 0.008 for the developed market countries and is significantly 
positive (t-statistic = 3.29). This is consistent with nontax costs being relatively low in developed 
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economies, thereby allowing the business group ownership structure to allocate resources to take 
advantage of favorable tax provisions.  
In contrast, the results for the emerging market countries are not consistent with the 
findings for the overall sample. Column (2) shows that for emerging markets the coefficient on 
the business group indicator is negative (-0.004) but is only marginally significant (t-statistic = -
1.86). The negative coefficient on the group indicator variable in the emerging market countries, 
relative to the significantly positive coefficient for the business group variable in the developed 
market countries, is consistent with the view that the nontax costs of tax avoidance for business 
group firms are higher in emerging market countries than in developed market countries. Thus, 
these results provide evidence that the higher nontax costs of emerging market countries 
constrain the ability of ultimate owners to direct resources to take full advantage of tax 
avoidance opportunities. To assess the economic significance of the results, note that the median 
tax avoidance is 0.077. The difference in tax avoidance between the business group coefficients 
between the developed an emerging market samples, of 0.012 represents approximately 15% of 
the median tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
5. Additional Tests 
5.1 Using a Large Group Indicator Variable 
 As noted above, a business group in our sample includes at least two affiliated firms. It is 
not clear whether this arrangement would provide the ultimate owners with sufficient flexibility 
to shift resources to reduce the tax liability. We therefore define a large group indicator that is 
equal to one if the firm is part of a group of more than three firms and zero otherwise. To 
maintain our propensity score matches, we exclude firms in business groups with one or more 
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firms and their matches. Therefore our sample is limited to firms in large business groups and 
their propensity score matched stand-alone firms. As shown in Table 1, the median group size in 
our sample is three at the firm level. We report the results in Table 5. The results suggest that 
large groups are better able to shift resource to reduce their tax liability.  
Specifically, we find that the coefficient on the large group indicator for the overall 
sample of 0.007 is greater than the coefficient of 0.003 for the group indicator variable from 
Table 3. We also find that, in the developed market sample, the coefficient for the large group 
indicator of 0.011 is greater than the coefficient of 0.008 for the group indicator in Table 4 and 
the coefficient for the large group indicator in the emerging market sample of -0.001 is greater 
than the coefficient for the group indicator in the emerging market sample of -0.004 reported in 
Table 4. This evidence supports the contention that larger groups are better able to reduce the tax 
liability for member firms in developed markets, but not in emerging markets. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
5.2 Changes in business group affiliation 
To further alleviate concerns about correlated omitted variables and reverse causality, we 
next estimate a change regression by examining how becoming a part of a business group 
through the mergers and acquisitions process relates to changes in a firm’s tax avoidance. We 
identify acquisitions from the SDC Platinum database. The dependent variable is the change in 
tax avoidance (tax avoidance year t+1 less tax avoidance year t-1). Our test variable is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm was acquired by a business group, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient on this variable captures the change in tax avoidance associated with being 
acquired by a business group versus other types of mergers and acquisitions. We then estimate 
the regressions on the smaller sample (N = 2,561 for developed market, 1,043 for emerging 
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market, respectively). In the regression we also include changes in the same firm-level controls 
from year t-1 to year t+1.   
Table 6 presents the results. We find a significantly positive coefficient on the group 
variable for the full sample (coefficient = 0.009, t-statistic = 1.69) and the developed market 
sample (coefficient = 0.017, t-statistic = 2.31). However, the coefficient in the emerging market 
sample is not significant at conventional levels (coefficient = -0.008, t-statistic =-0.67). In short, 
the findings in Table 6 show that the degree of a firm’s tax avoidance increases after they 
become a member of a business group in developed markets, but not in emerging markets, and 
thus reinforce our earlier results. 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
5.3 Controlling for country characteristics 
In prior tests, we use country indicator variables to control for tax levels for each country. 
This approach also has the advantage of capturing any unobservable time-invariant country-
specific factors that affect the level of tax avoidance without imposing a common linear relation 
between the country-specific variables and the average level of tax avoidance in a given country. 
An alternative approach is to use country-level control variables (Atwood et al. 2012).15 To this 
end, we now replace country indicators with seven country-level controls, that is: (i) the level of 
required book-tax conformity [BTaxC]; (ii) an indicator for countries with a worldwide approach 
[WW] to tax foreign income; (iii) the tax evasion index [TaxEnf ] to capture perceived tax 
enforcement; (iv) the statutory corporate tax rate in the home country [TaxRate] to capture the 
impact of tax system characteristics on tax avoidance; (v) the average of variable pay as a 
percentage of total compensation for ﬁrms in the country [VarComp] to capture management 
incentives for tax avoidance (Phillips 2003; Rego and Wilson 2012; Hanlon and Heitzman 
																																								 																				
15 We provide detailed descriptions of the calculation of the country-level controls in Appendix B. 
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2009); (vi) the cross-sectional earnings volatility [Earnvol] to control for differences in the cross-
sectional variance in pre-tax earnings; and (vii) the country’s legal factor  
We present the results with the above country-level controls in Table 7. We continue to 
find significantly positive coefficients for the group indicator variable in the overall sample and 
developed market sample. However, the coefficient on the group indicator variable in the 
emerging market sample is not significant. One reason for the drop in significance is the loss in 
the number of observations due to the additional country-level data required by this test. This is 
especially problematic in the emerging market sample. In the developed markets, the sample size 
drops from 40,951 to 37,887 (8%), while in emerging markets the sample size drops from 25,626 
to 19,157 (25%).16 To provide evidence on this issue, we estimate the regression after replacing 
the country level variables with country indicators, using the same sample in Table 7. The results 
(not reported) indicate that the coefficient on the group indicator variable in the emerging market 
sample is not significant (t-statistic = -1.06), which suggests that the loss in power from the 
smaller sample partially explains the insignificant result reported in Table 7.17 In addition, it is 
likely that the measures such as variable compensation and earnings volatility could be 
correlated with cross-country differences in nontax costs. 
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
 
5.4 Excluding Japan 
																																								 																				
16 The emerging market countries without sufficient country level data are Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Peru, the 
Philippines, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey. 
17 When we use a similar procedure for the developed market sample, the coefficient on the group variable remains 
significantly positive (t-statistic = 2.74). 
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Firms from Japan make up a substantial portion of our sample. As a result, it is possible 
that our results are driven by Japan and do not generalize more broadly. We therefore conduct 
our analyses after excluding Japan and report the results in Table 8. 
We find that our results are not robust to the exclusion of Japan. For the overall sample 
and the developed market sample, when we exclude Japan, the coefficients on the group and 
large group indicator variables decline and are no longer significant. Therefore the positive 
relation between business group affiliation and tax avoidance in developed market countries is 
sensitive to the exclusion of Japan. This result suggests that our prior finding that business group 
membership allows firms to increase their tax avoidance may not generalize to developed 
countries outside of Japan.  
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
One reason for the apparent impact of Japan on the empirical relation between group 
membership and tax avoidance is that Japan has a code law legal origin, while several other 
developed market countries, such as Australia, Great Britain and Singapore have a legal system 
based on English common law. The legal origin should fundamentally shape each country’s tax 
laws as well as firms’ relationships with stakeholders such as governments, lending banks and 
their employees (Ball et al. [2000]). English common law protects outside minority investors 
more effectively than code law by making it easier for minority shareholders to obtain relief 
through the legal system (La Porta et al. 1998, 2002: Claessens et al. 2002; Dyck and Zingales 
2004; Leuz et al. 2003).18 In addition, the investor protection associated with common law allows 
investors to more effectively monitor and constrain management behavior. This is consistent 
																																								 																				
18 Private control benefits include opportunities to engage in tunneling, self-dealing, perquisite consumption, empire 
building, and the expropriation of corporate growth opportunities (Grossman and Hart 1980; Barclay and Holderness 
1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999; Johnson et al. 2000; Nenova 2003; Dyck and Zingales 
2004; Djankov et al. 2008). 
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with the finding of prior research (e.g., Leuz, et al. 2003; and Ball, et al. 2000) that common law 
is associated with higher earnings quality. Thus a common law legal system could inhibit 
ultimate owners from pursuing aggressive tax strategies that could lead minority shareholders to 
suspect rent extraction. 
Therefore, excluding Japan from the sample removes a substantial number of 
observations from code law countries and increases the proportion of the sample drawn from 
common law countries where the opportunities for business groups to shift income are limited by 
minority shareholder legal protections. To provide evidence on this issue we estimate our 
regression on a sample of developed market, code law countries, excluding Japan.19 We report 
the results for the group and large group indicator variables in the last two columns of Table 8. 
We find significantly positive coefficients for both group indicator variables. This evidence 
supports the contention that the legal protections provided by common law legal systems deter 
ultimate owners from shifting resources and income in order to reduce tax payments of group 
firms in developed market countries.  
 
5.5. Determinants of the Extent of Business Group Tax Avoidance 
To provide additional insight into how the nontax costs impact tax avoidance for business 
group firms, we conduct tests on the extent of tax avoidance within our business group sample 
(excluding stand-alone firms) and report the results in Table 9. Panel A reports the findings for 
the full sample and Panel B shows the findings separately for the developed and emerging 
markets. For brevity, we suppress the presentation of the results for the firm-level controls.  
																																								 																				
19 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
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Our first variable is the extent of the ultimate owners’ direct ownership. We find that 
ultimate owners’ direct ownership is negatively associated with firms’ tax avoidance behavior in 
the full sample (Panel A) and in emerging market countries (Panel B). This result is in line with   
the view that an increase in the ultimate owners’ direct ownership increases the nontax costs, 
particularly, price discounts by minority shareholders that are more severe in emerging market 
countries, leading to a lower degree of tax avoidance. 
Our second variable is the percentage of foreign sales revenue.  We find a significantly 
negative relation between the percentage of foreign sales and tax avoidance in the full sample 
(Panel A) and in emerging market countries (Panel B). This suggests that among business group 
firms, firms that generate a higher proportion of revenue from foreign sources tend to exhibit a 
lower degree of tax avoidance. While this finding is contrary to findings based on U.S. 
multinationals, we note that the U.S. tax rate is generally higher than foreign tax rates, and U.S. 
companies often invest in tax haven countries. In contrast, the tax rates in emerging market 
countries (see Table 2) could be below the rates paid by affiliated firms operating outside the 
domestic market.  
[Insert Table 9 about Here] 
Our third variable identifies whether a group is vertically structured (a.k.a. pyramidal 
structures) or horizontally structured. A horizontal integration indicates an organization that 
consists of similar firms in the same industry. A vertically integrated structure, whereby a firm 
develops its business operations into different steps on the same production path (e.g., when a 
manufacturer owns its supplier and/or distributor), may facilitate the transfer of corporate 
resources between different layers of the pyramidal structure to reduce their tax payments. We 
find that while it is insignificant in the developed market sample, the coefficient on “Vertical” is 
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positive and significant (at the 10% level) in the emerging market sample, which is consistent 
with vertically structured business groups displaying a greater degree of tax avoidance than 
horizontally structured groups in emerging market countries. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
 In this paper we investigate how the business group ownership structure and country-
level characteristics combine to influence the degree of a firm’s tax avoidance. The ability of a 
business group to access and control the distribution of capital and resources across group 
affiliates should allow business group firms to better take advantage of tax planning 
opportunities, but at the cost of increasing nontax costs.  
 We use the Osiris and Worldscope databases to identify firms as being affiliated with a 
business group, and the MSCI Emerging Markets Fund to identify emerging market countries. 
Our sample period covers the 14-year period of 2000–2013.  
On average, we find that business group firms exhibit more tax avoidance than stand-
alone firms. This suggests that ultimate owners are able to use their financial flexibility and 
control to allocate resources to reduce their tax liability and overcome the associated nontax 
costs. We also find that this result is concentrated in developed market countries. In emerging 
market countries we find that business group firms exhibit less tax avoidance than stand-alone 
firms. This is consistent with emerging market countries having larger nontax costs that inhibit 
their ability to reduce their tax payments. 
However, we find that the negative relation between tax avoidance and group affiliation 
in emerging markets becomes insignificant if we replace country-specific indicator variables 
with country level controls. In addition, we find that the positive relation between business group 
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affiliation and tax avoidance in developed markets is sensitive to the exclusion of Japan. In 
subsequent tests we find that the positive relation between the two holds generally for business 
groups in developed market countries with a code law system, which suggests that investor 
protection provided by a common law legal system deters owners from shifting resources to 
avoid taxes for group firms. 
 Overall, although our findings are not conclusive, they suggest that the relation between 
business group affiliation and tax avoidance is a complicated issue and is conditional on the costs 
of shifting income. Therefore, further work on other conditions that affect the relative tax 
avoidance of business group firms in various countries could yield interesting insights. 
Specifically identifying stronger measures of specific nontax costs could provide further 
information on how a country’s characteristics impact the influence of organizational structure in 
shaping corporate tax planning and strategy.  
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables of interest	
Group	 =	 An indicator variable that equals one if a firm belongs to a business 
group. A business group is defined as a set of firms owned by the 
same ultimate owner. We define a shareholder of a firm to be the 
ultimate owner if that shareholder’s stake in the firm exceeds 25 
percent directly or via a control chain whose links all exceed 25 
percent. (Source: Bureau van Dijk and Worldscope).	
Large Group	 =	 An indicator variable that equals one if a firm belongs to a business 
group witj more than three firms. (Source: Bureau van Dijk and 
Wordscope).	
TaxAvoid	 =	  
where: 
PTEBX = pre-tax earnings before exceptional items (PI – XI); 
 = home-country statutory corporate income tax rate; and 
CTP = current taxes paid (TXC – the change in TXP). 
(Source: Compustat Global).	
Ultimate Owners’ 
Cash Flow Right	
=	 The direct ownership of the ultimate owner in percentage. (Source: 
Bureau van Dijk and Worldscope). 
	
PctForeignSales	 =	 The ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Source: Compustat Global).	
Vertical	 =	 An indicator for a business group where the controlling shareholder 
holds both direct and indirect stakes in affiliated firms. (Source: 
Bureau van Dijk and Worldscope).	
Firm-level control variables	
Pre-Tax ROA	 =	 Pre-tax income before exceptional items (PI – XI) divided by lagged 
total assets (AT). (Source: Compustat Global).	
Size	 =	 The natural log of total assets (AT). Source: Compustat Global.	
CashSize	 =	 Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHE) divided by lagged total 
assets (AT). Source: Compustat Global.	
R&D	 =	 Research and development expense (XRD) divided by lagged total 
assets (AT). Source: Compustat Global.	
Lev	 =	 Total long-term liabilities (DLC + DLTT) divided by total assets 
(AT). Source: Compustat Global.	
SalesGrowth	 =	 The three-year average change in sales (SALE). Source: Compustat 
Global.	
CapInt	 =	 Net property plant & equipment (PPENT) divided by total assets 
(AT). Source: Compustat Global.	
InvInt	 =	 Inventory (INVT) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Global.	
FirmAge	 =	 The number of years after a given firm’s initial public offering. 
Source: SDC Platinum and Compustat Global.	
Multi	 =	 An indicator variable which equals zero if foreign income taxes is 
missing or zero, and equals one otherwise.	
Idiosyncratic Risk	 =	 The standard error from estimating the one-factor market model on 
each firm’s monthly stock returns in the five years prior to 2002. 
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Source: Compustat Global.	
Index Return at 
Listing	
=	 The annual market index return in the year of a firm’s listing. 
Sources: Datastream and SDC Global Issue.	
Dual	 =	 An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has dual-class 
shares. Sources: Data Stream, CRSP and National Stock Exchange 
Documents.	
FamilyFirm	 =	 An indicator variable which equals zero if the type of direct ultimate 
ownership is “Individual(s) or family(ies)” or “One or more 
named individuals”. Source: Osiris.	
Industry-level control variables	
RD_Intensity	 =	 R&D Intensity computed as the average three-digit SIC level for the 
period 2000-2013 based on Compustat ﬁrms. . R&D intensity is the 
ratio between R&D expenditures and sales.	
ExternalFinance	 =	 External Finance Dependence is the ratio between capital 
expenditures minus cash ﬂow from operations and capital 
expenditures.	
LernerIndex	 =	 Lerner Index of Competition is based on U.S. ﬁrms and is computed 
as the three-digit industry average of 1 minus proﬁts over sales for 
the period 2000–2013.	
Country-level control variables	
BtaxC	 =	 The level of book-tax conformity from Atwood et al. (2012)	
WW	 =	 A dummy variable, which takes on the value of one for ﬁrms in home 
countries with a worldwide approach, and the value of zero for ﬁrms 
in home countries with a territorial approach;	
TaxEnf	 =	 Managers’ perceptions of the strength of tax enforcement in the 
country, from the 1996 World Competitiveness Report	
TaxRate	 =	 The statutory corporate tax rate in the home country (Sources: a 
KPMG LLP online summary, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s online 
information, and Coopers & Lybrand LLP’s worldwide tax summary 
guides)	
VarComp	 =	 The country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of 
management compensation (Source: Towers Perrin 2005)	
Earnvol	 =	 The scaled descending decile rank of cross-sectional pre-tax earnings 
volatility by country-year	
CommonLaw	 =	 An indicator variable that equals one if the country has a common 
law origin. (Source: La Porta et al. 1998)	
Emerging	 =	 An indicator variable that equals one if the country is classified as an 
emerging capital market. (Source: MSCI emerging markets fund)	
LegalFactor	 =	 Institutional factors (Factor) using the results of a factor analysis of 
the country’s legal tradition (common law versus code law), strength 
of investor rights, and ownership concentration as developed by La 
Porta et al. (1998).	
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APPENDIX B 
Measures of Country-Level Tax Characteristics from Atwood et al. (2012) 
 
 We use the four proxies for country-level tax characteristics from Atwood et al. (2012).  
BtaxC is a proxy for required book-tax conformity. Atwood, Drake and Myers (2010) develop 
this measure by computing the conditional variance of current tax expense (CTE) for a given 
level of pre-tax book income (PTBI) in a given country-year (i.e., Var(CTE|PTBI)). Countries 
with a lower conditional variance are assumed to have less ﬂexibility in tax planning activities 
for a given level of reported pre-tax earnings, thereby requiring higher required book-tax 
conformity. That is, CTE is a proxy for the required level of book-tax conformity in the ﬁrm’s 
home country. Specifically, Atwood et al. (2010) measure the conditional variance of current tax 
expense from the following model, which is estimated by country-year: 
 CTEt =h0 + h1PTBIt + h2ForPTBIt + h3DIVt + et    (4) 
CTE is current tax expense (Item #23 – Item #25); PTBI is pre-tax book income (Item #21); 
ForPTBI is estimated foreign pre-tax book income (foreign tax expense (Item #51)/total tax 
expense (Item #23) * PTBI); DIV is total dividends (Item #34); and e is the error term. We scale 
all variables by average total assets (Item #89). BtaxC is computed as the ranking of the root 
mean squared errors (RMSEs) from the equation (4). Countries with higher rankings of RMSEs 
in a given year have higher required book-tax conformity.  
 The second control is an indicator variable (WW) for ﬁrms domiciling in home countries 
that use a worldwide approach to taxing foreign income as opposed to taking a territorial 
approach (Attwood et al. 2012). These data are extracted from PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide Summary guides and from the Ernst & Young Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide for years 1990 through 2008. These guides document the percentage of 
dividends from foreign subsidiaries that are subject to tax. We categorize countries as territorial 
if they exempt from tax at least 75 percent of foreign subsidiary dividends. The level of tax 
avoidance is expected to be lower when countries adopt the worldwide approach to taxing 
foreign income.  
TaxEnf is a proxy for perceived tax enforcement. Following Attwood et al. (2012), we 
use the tax evasion index from the 1996 World Competitiveness Report, which is constructed 
based on a survey of more than 2,000 business executives per country. Respondents answer their 
agreement with the statement ‘‘Tax evasion is minimal in your country’’ on a scale from one 
through six (where one denotes strongly disagree and six denotes strongly agree). Therefore, 
higher numbers suggest that tax enforcement is considered to be stronger. Attwood et al. (2012) 
predicts that the association between tax avoidance and TaxEnf will be negative. Finally, the 
statutory corporate tax rate is included as a significant control variable capturing the impact of 
tax system characteristics on tax avoidance. As a general rule, the beneﬁts of engaging in tax 
avoidance are predicted to be greater when the statutory tax rate is higher. Following Attwood et 
al. (2012), we collect the statutory corporate tax rates (TaxRate) from a KPMG LLP online 
summary, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s online information, and Coopers & Lybrand LLP’s 
worldwide tax summary guides. 
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APPENDIX C 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
We use the following logistic regression model to predict the business group affiliation:  
Prob(Groupi,t=1) = α + β1 ln(Total Assets)I,t-1 + β2 ln(Cash Flow) i,t-1 + β3 ROA i,t-1  
                           + β4 ln(Firm Age) i,t-1 + β5 R&D Intensity i,t-1  
                           + β6 External Finance Dependence i,t-1   
                           + β7 Lerner Index of Competition i,t-1 + γYear + ηCountry +  ε  (1a) 
Prob(Group=1) is equal to one for a group firm, and zero otherwise; ln(Total Assets) is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets; ln(Cash Flow) is the natural logarithm of cash flow 
from operating activities; ROA is net income divided by total assets; ln(Firm Age) is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the date of incorporation. R&D Intensity, External 
Finance Dependence and Lerner Index are computed as their average values for each of 
Campbell (1996) industries using Compustat North America ﬁrms. R&D intensity is the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales. External Finance Dependence is capital expenditures less cash ﬂow 
from operations divided by capital expenditures. Lerner Index of Competition is computed as the 
Campbell (1996) industry average of 1 minus proﬁts over sales estimated. We measure all 
variables at the year of firms’ initial public offering. We estimate Equation (1a) using all firms 
included in Compustat Global with sufficient data.  
Panel A reports the estimation results for Equation (1a). Equation (1a) is a strong 
predictor of the business group affiliation as reflected in high proportion of concordant pairs 
(87.1%) and low proportion of discordant pair (12.9%). The results suggest that firms with 
greater profitability and larger size have a higher probability of affiliation. These findings are 
generally consistent with the winner-picking view whereby groups identify ﬁrms with higher 
expected profitability. Business groups are more prevalent in industries with higher R&D 
intensity and external finance dependence. This is consistent with the view that the group 
structure fosters R&D activity through internal financing (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Belenzon 
and Berkovitz 2010). 
We match each affiliate to the four stand-alones domiciled in the same country whose 
propensity score distance is closest to that of the affiliate with replacement. Panel B provides the 
standardized differences in our control variables between group-affiliated and stand-alone firms. 
The results suggest that the procedure is effective in removing most of the differences between 
the two samples. However, a few differences, most notably firm size, remain.  
 
Panel A: Logistic regression results on probability of business-group afﬁliation 
 
Variable	
Coefficient 
(p-value)	
Firm characteristics:	 	
ln(Total Assets)	 0.085***	
ln(Cash Flow)	 0.003***	
ROA	 0.000***	
ln(Firm Age)	 0.013***	
Industry characteristics:	 	
R&D Intensity (R&D/Sales)	 6.772***	
External Finance Dependence	 2.679***	
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Lerner Index of Competition	 2.479***	
	 	
N	 119,694	
Pseudo R2	 0.07	
Percent concordant	 87.1	
Percent discordant	 12.9	
 
Panel B: Covariate balance—Standardized difference between affiliates and stand-alones 
  
Variable	 Standardized Diff.	
	 	
Dual	 0.100	
FamilyFirm	 0.050	
Pre-Tax ROA	 -0.047	
Size	 0.519***	
CashSize	 -0.108*	
R&D	 -0.072	
Lev	 0.092	
SalesGrowth	 0.007	
Multi	 -0.085	
bTaxC	 -0.229**	
WW	 -0.145*	
TaxEnf	 -0.159*	
TaxRate	 -0.134*	
VarComp	 -0.027	
Earnvol	 -0.047	
LegalFactor	 -0.250	
 
Panel A reports coefficient estimates from estimating a logistic model to predict business group 
affiliation. Panel B reports the standardized differences between group firms and the matched stand-alone 
firms for covariate balancing. Standardized differences of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 correspond to small, medium, 
and large differences between the treatment sample and the control sample, respectively (Cohen 1988). 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 level, respectively. The dependent variable, Group, is 
equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a business group, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables include ln(Total 
Assets), a natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, and Cash Flow, cash flow from operating activities. 
ROA is proﬁts over total assets. Age is the number of years since the date of incorporation. R&D 
Intensity, External Finance Dependence and Lerner Index are computed as the average Campbell 
(1996) industry level for the period 2000–2013 based on Compustat North America ﬁrms. R&D intensity 
is the ratio between R&D expenditures and sales. External Finance Dependence is the ratio between 
capital expenditures minus cash ﬂow from operations and capital expenditures. Lerner Index of 
Competition is computed as the Campbell (1996) industry average of 1 minus proﬁts over sales for the 
period 2000–2013. All regressions include a complete set of country and year dummies. The sample 
period spans 2000 to 2013, containing firms affiliated with the business group and stand-alone firms 
during this period. Only firm-year observations at the IPO year are included in the sample. Robust 
standard errors are estimated and are clustered at the firm level. 
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Table 1 Sample Firms 
Panel A: Distribution by Country 
	 	
Stand-alone Firms	 Group-affiliated firms	
Country	 Economy	 Firms	 Firm-years	 Firms	 Firm-years	
Australia 	 Developed	 199	 1,211	 89	 536	
Austria	 Developed	 27	 148	 14	 100	
Belgium	 Developed	 43	 307	 26	 214	
Brazil	 Emerging	 99	 685	 75	 466	
Canada	 Developed	 40	 222	 37	 67	
Chile	 Emerging	 67	 546	 64	 514	
Colombia	 Emerging	 2	 5	 3	 14	
Denmark	 Developed	 47	 360	 20	 159	
Finland	 Developed	 48	 424	 22	 99	
France	 Developed	 227	 1,742	 145	 1,053	
Germany	 Developed	 232	 1,582	 139	 893	
Greece	 Emerging	 73	 476	 45	 222	
Hong Kong SAR	 Developed	 228	 1,535	 90	 639	
India	 Emerging	 660	 5,271	 279	 1,872	
Indonesia	 Emerging	 102	 497	 60	 252	
Ireland	 Developed	 8	 60	 4	 33	
Israel	 Developed	 118	 541	 92	 400	
Italy	 Developed	 65	 420	 54	 364	
Japan	 Developed	 1,671	 12,253	 816	 5,010	
Korea, Republic of	 Emerging	 301	 1,484	 240	 1,239	
Malaysia	 Emerging	 257	 1,669	 130	 856	
Mexico	 Emerging	 53	 401	 26	 126	
Netherlands	 Developed	 63	 464	 37	 287	
New Zealand	 Developed	 9	 73	 4	 28	
Norway	 Developed	 53	 304	 36	 180	
Peru	 Emerging	 42	 297	 38	 304	
Philippines	 Emerging	 40	 217	 51	 349	
Poland	 Emerging	 107	 615	 58	 327	
Portugal	 Developed	 11	 93	 9	 60	
Singapore	 Developed	 218	 1,399	 99	 616	
South Africa	 Emerging	 121	 807	 81	 525	
Spain	 Developed	 53	 455	 38	 301	
Sweden	 Developed	 132	 916	 63	 435	
Switzerland	 Developed	 85	 702	 50	 363	
Taiwan	 Emerging	 470	 2,749	 194	 1,007	
Thailand	 Emerging	 95	 716	 46	 298	
Turkey	 Emerging	 99	 452	 75	 369	
United Kingdom	 Developed	 439	 3,068	 166	 833	
Total	 	 6,604	 45,166	 3,515	 21,410	
 
Panel B: Business group ownership structure 
	 Mean	 Median	 Q1	 Q3	
Direct ownership by the ultimate owner	 0.67	 0.60	 0.39	 1.00	
Number of affiliated firms (Business group level)	 4.53	 2.00	 2.00	 4.00	
Number of affiliated firms (Firm Level)	 8.28	 3.00	 2.00	 7.00	
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This table displays information regarding the stand-alone and business-group affiliated firms in our sample. Panel A 
provides the number of firms and firm-years by country and each country’s classification. For each business group, 
Panel B provides the percentage of direct ownership by the ultimate owner, and the number of affiliated firms for 
each business group and the number of firms in the sample affiliated with a given business group. 
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Table 2 Sample Descriptions 
Panel A: Sample distribution by industry  
Industry  
(Campbell 1996)	
Stand-alone Firms	 	 Group-affiliated firms	
Firm-
years	 %	
	 Firm-
years	 %	
Basic industry	 465	 1.03	 	 461	 2.15	
Capital goods	 5,678	 12.57	 	 2,030	 9.48	
Construction	 99	 0.22	 	 61	 0.28	
Consumer durables	 2,243	 4.97	 	 1,111	 5.19	
Finance & real estate	 5,524	 12.23	 	 1,656	 7.73	
Food & tobacco	 1,295	 2.87	 	 1,605	 7.5	
Leisure	 6,714	 14.87	 	 3,406	 15.91	
Others	 383	 0.85	 	 533	 2.49	
Petroleum	 3,081	 6.82	 	 1,846	 8.62	
Services	 9,568	 21.18	 	 3,862	 18.04	
Textiles & trade	 1,782	 3.95	 	 988	 4.61	
Transportation	 3,864	 8.56	 	 2,337	 10.92	
Utilities	 4,470	 9.9	 	 1,514	 7.07	
Total	 45,166	 100.00	 	 21,410	 100.00	
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for variables 
	 Stand-alone Firms	 	 Group-affiliated firms	
	 N	 Mean	 Median	 Std	 	 N	 Mean	 Median	 Std	
Key variable:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
TaxAvoid	 45,166	 0.117	 0.077	 0.200	 	 21,410	 0.119	 0.082	 0.194	
Firm-level:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Dual	 45,166	 0.007	 0.000	 0.082	 	 21,410	 0.021	 0.000	 0.141	
FamilyFirm	 45,166	 0.039	 0.000	 0.194	 	 21,410	 0.051	 0.000	 0.221	
Pre-Tax ROA	 45,166	 0.088	 0.072	 0.064	 	 21,410	 0.086	 0.070	 0.062	
Size	 45,166	 5.527	 5.379	 1.715	 	 21,410	 6.469	 6.416	 1.836	
CashSize	 45,166	 0.166	 0.124	 0.142	 	 21,410	 0.148	 0.107	 0.131	
R&D	 45,166	 0.011	 0.000	 0.026	 	 21,410	 0.010	 0.000	 0.024	
Lev	 45,166	 0.216	 0.181	 0.189	 	 21,410	 0.237	 0.217	 0.187	
SalesGrowth	 45,166	 0.150	 0.111	 0.160	 	 21,410	 0.151	 0.112	 0.161	
CapInt	 45,166	 0.300	 0.272	 0.203	 	 21,410	 0.313	 0.291	 0.206	
InvInt	 45,166	 0.130	 0.108	 0.115	 	 21,410	 0.113	 0.093	 0.101	
FirmAge	 45,166	 10.193	 9.000	 6.122	 	 21,410	 11.057	 11.000	 6.129	
Multi	 45,166	 0.071	 0.000	 0.256	 	 21,410	 0.068	 0.000	 0.252	
Country-level:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BTaxC	 45,129	 0.012	 0.011	 0.005	 	 21,383	 0.012	 0.011	 0.005	
WW	 39,342	 0.721	 1.000	 0.449	 	 17,702	 0.677	 1.000	 0.468	
TaxEnf	 45,166	 3.675	 4.200	 0.960	 	 21,410	 3.573	 3.700	 0.966	
TaxRate	 45,166	 0.310	 0.300	 0.075	 	 21,410	 0.306	 0.300	 0.075	
VarComp	 39,957	 0.301	 0.240	 0.125	 	 18,029	 0.318	 0.280	 0.127	
Earnvol	 45,166	 0.722	 0.754	 0.176	 	 21,410	 0.727	 0.766	 0.175	
Legal Factor	 44,551	 3.622	 3.682	 1.402	 	 21,083	 3.382	 3.682	 1.423	
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This table presents descriptive statistics for stand-alone firms and group-affiliated firms for the full sample. Variable definitions 
are in Appendix A.   
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Table 3 
The effect of the group affiliation on corporate tax avoidance 
 
	 	 Two-Stage Simultaneous Equations	
	 OLS (1)	
Stage 1 
(2)	
Stage 2 
(3)	
Dep. Variable =	 TaxAvoid	 Pr(Group 
Indicator=1)	 TaxAvoid	
Group	 0.003**	 	 	
	 (2.21)	 	 	
Group Probability	 	 	 0.100*	
	 	 	 (1.96)	
Firm-level controls:	 	 	 	
Dual	 0.007	 0.015	 -0.007	
	 (1.26)	 (1.16)	 (-0.77)	
FamilyFirm	 -0.020***	 0.117***	 -0.033***	
	 (-5.50)	 (23.93)	 (-4.82)	
Pre-Tax ROA	 0.170***	 0.02	 0.175***	
	 (13.18)	 (1.33)	 (17.3)	
Size	 -0.003***	 0.029***	 -0.001	
	 (-6.15)	 (48.85)	 (-0.41)	
CashSize	 0.003	 -0.039***	 0.022***	
	 (0.56)	 (-5.29)	 (4.12)	
R&D	 0.077***	 0.007***	 0.000	
	 (4.60)	 (3.12)	 (-0.54)	
Lev	 0.034***	 -0.051***	 0.033***	
	 (7.78)	 (-9.46)	 (7.51)	
SalesGrowth	 0.132***	 -0.004	 0.076***	
	 (26.88)	 (-0.89)	 (28.63)	
CapInt	 0.008**	 -0.008	 0.034***	
	 (1.97)	 (-1.28)	 (8.71)	
InvInt	 -0.044***	 -0.141***	 0.006	
	 (-5.64)	 (-13.48)	 (0.58)	
FirmAge	 0.001***	 -0.001**	 0.000	
	 (4.78)	 (-2.53)	 (-1.29)	
Multi	 0.018***	 0.006	 0.027***	
	 (5.41)	 (1.32)	 (9.22)	
Instrumental Variables:	 	 	 	
Idiosyncratic Risk	 	 0.262***	 	
	 	 (3.52)	 	
RD_Intensity	 	 0.736***	 	
	 	 (9.64)	 	
External Finance Dependence	 	 0.131***	 	
	 	 (5.17)	 	
LernerIndex	 	 0.28***	 	
	 	 (7.13)	 	
Index Return at Listing	 	 -0.015***	 	
	 	 (-4.58)	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
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Industry dummies	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Obs.	 66,576	 90,790	 66,576	
R2 / Pseudo R2	 0.27	 0.09	 0.23	
Partial F-Statistic	 	 F = 141.12 (P-value < 0.0001)	
Over-identification test	 	 Chi-sq = 176.52 (P-value = 0.0000)	
Under-identification test	 	 Chi-sq = 176.52 (P-value = 0.0000)	
Weak Identification Test	 	 Cragg-Donald Wald F = 35.28	
	 	
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 26.87 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 15.09	
Endogeneity Test	 	 Chi-sq = 3.77 (p  < 0.05)	
 
The dependent variable is the extent of tax avoidance. Data are annual for the period 2000–2013. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. Panel A presents OLS regression results. Panel B presents results for a two-stage 
simultaneous equation estimation. In the first stage, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to one 
if the firm is in a business group. The estimated probability is an independent variable in the second stage. Standard 
errors are robust standard errors clustered by year and country (Peterson 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
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Table 4 
The effect of business group affiliation on corporate tax avoidance: 
Emerging versus developed markets 
 
	 Developed 
Market	 	
Emerging 
Market	
	 (1)	 	 (2)	
Group	 0.008***	 	 -0.004*	
	 (3.29)	 	 (-1.86)	
Firm-level controls:	 	 	 	
Dual	 -0.008	 	 0.009	
	 (-0.72)	 	 (0.65)	
FamilyFirm	 -0.023***	 	 -0.013**	
	 (-3.05)	 	 (-1.98)	
Pre-Tax ROA	 0.185***	 	 0.157***	
	 (5.89)	 	 (6.43)	
Size	 -0.004***	 	 -0.000	
	 (-3.92)	 	 (-0.06)	
CashSize	 0.018	 	 -0.019*	
	 (1.33)	 	 (-1.87)	
R&D	 0.004	 	 0.114***	
	 (0.10)	 	 (2.95)	
Lev	 0.039***	 	 0.024***	
	 (4.54)	 	 (2.79)	
SalesGrowth	 0.163***	 	 0.097***	
	 (11.56)	 	 (9.65)	
CapInt	 0.015***	 	 -0.002	
	 (3.11)	 	 (-0.27)	
InvInt	 -0.057***	 	 -0.013	
	 (-5.37)	 	 (-0.92)	
FirmAge	 0.001***	 	 -0.000	
	 (2.82)	 	 (-0.33)	
Multi	 0.022	 	 0.011	
	 (1.65)	 	 (0.80)	
	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Obs.	 40,951	 	 25,626	
Adj. R2	 0.24	 	 0.26	
 
The table presents OLS regression results with the dependent variable representing the extent of tax avoidance. 
“Group”, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a business group, and 0 otherwise. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by country and year (Petersen, 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
Large Group Indicator 
Model	 Overall 
Sample	
Developed 
Market	
Emerging 
Market	
Large Group	 0.007***	 0.011***	 -0.001	
	 (3.20)	 (3.37)	 (-0.45)	
Firm-level controls:	 	 	 	
Dual	 0.003	 -0.020	 0.008	
	 (0.40)	 (-1.57)	 (0.55)	
FamilyFirm	 -0.017***	 -0.006	 -0.025***	
	 (-3.06)	 (-0.50)	 (-2.89)	
Pre-Tax ROA	 0.202***	 0.199***	 0.205***	
	 (10.61)	 (4.96)	 (7.40)	
Size	 -0.004***	 -0.005***	 -0.001	
	 (-5.40)	 (-4.60)	 (-0.42)	
CashSize	 0.008	 0.042**	 -0.043***	
	 (0.91)	 (2.58)	 (-3.32)	
R&D	 0.094***	 0.019	 0.130***	
	 (3.69)	 (0.36)	 (2.63)	
Lev	 0.034***	 0.038***	 0.019*	
	 (5.35)	 (3.22)	 (1.77)	
SalesGrowth	 0.135***	 0.173***	 0.096***	
	 (18.63)	 (10.92)	 (7.67)	
CapInt	 -0.008	 0.002	 -0.017*	
	 (-1.26)	 (0.21)	 (-1.87)	
InvInt	 -0.067***	 -0.078***	 -0.039*	
	 (-6.28)	 (-5.65)	 (-1.87)	
FirmAge	 0.001***	 0.001***	 0.000	
	 (4.96)	 (3.48)	 (0.95)	
Multi	 0.022***	 0.020	 0.040***	
	 (4.47)	 (1.59)	 (3.37)	
	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Obs.	 29,741	 18,079	 12,384	
Adj. R2	 0.27	 0.26	 0.26	
 
 
The table presents OLS regression results with the dependent variable representing the extent of tax avoidance. 
“Large Group”, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a business group with more than 
three firms, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered by country and year (Petersen, 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Shock to the Business Group Ownership Structure:  
Evidence from Merger and Acquisition, and Divestiture 
 
Model	 Overall 
Sample	
Developed 
Market	
Emerging 
Market	
ΔGroup	 0.009*	 0.017**	 -0.008	
	 (1.69)	 (2.31)	 (-0.67)	
Firm-level controls:	 	 	 	
ΔDual	 0.058**	 0.007	 0.162***	
	 (2.23)	 (0.22)	 (5.03)	
ΔFamilyFirm	 -0.008	 -0.012	 0.003	
	 (-0.54)	 (-0.64)	 (0.15)	
ΔPre-Tax ROA	 0.470***	 0.615***	 0.222	
	 (5.11)	 (5.78)	 (1.63)	
ΔSize	 0.007	 0.031**	 -0.029**	
	 (0.67)	 (2.20)	 (-2.14)	
ΔCashSize	 0.007	 0.028	 -0.015	
	 (0.18)	 (0.63)	 (-0.26)	
ΔR&D	 -0.603	 -0.710	 -0.309	
	 (-1.18)	 (-1.49)	 (-0.47)	
ΔLev	 0.094***	 0.088**	 0.109**	
	 (3.32)	 (2.39)	 (2.51)	
ΔSalesGrowth	 0.139***	 0.142***	 0.116***	
	 (5.62)	 (4.36)	 (2.86)	
ΔCapInt	 -0.159***	 -0.119	 -0.126**	
	 (-3.04)	 (-1.65)	 (-2.21)	
ΔInvInt	 -0.042	 -0.104	 0.042	
	 (-0.55)	 (-1.13)	 (0.38)	
ΔFirmAge	 0.012***	 0.010***	 0.020***	
	 (7.00)	 (5.12)	 (5.77)	
ΔMulti	 0.015	 0.010	 0.054*	
	 (1.02)	 (0.55)	 (1.81)	
	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Obs.	 3,604	 2,561	 1,043	
Adj. R2	 0.14	 0.15	 0.16	
 
The table presents OLS regression results with the dependent variable representing the change in levels of tax 
avoidance two years before and after the merger and acquisition as well as divestiture, which induces firms to be 
affiliated to the business group. “ΔGroup”, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a 
business group after the merger and acquisition as well as divestiture, -1 if the firm is not affiliated with a business 
group after the merger and acquisition as well as divestiture, and 0 otherwise. All the change values (Δ) are 
computed as the difference of a given variable two years before and after the merger and acquisition. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
country and year (Petersen, 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Controlling for Country Characteristics 
 
Model	 	 Overall 
Sample	
Developed 
Market	
Emerging 
Market	
Group	 	 0.003*	 0.008**	 -0.000	
	 	 (1.66)	 (2.15)	 (-0.11)	
Firm-level controls:	 	 	 	 	
Dual	 	 0.002	 -0.019	 0.012	
	 	 (0.25)	 (-1.30)	 (0.69)	
FamilyFirm	 	 -0.009**	 0.010	 -0.018*	
	 	 (-2.28)	 (0.72)	 (-1.96)	
Pre-Tax ROA	 	 0.223***	 0.244***	 0.176***	
	 	 (15.61)	 (5.47)	 (4.65)	
Size	 	 -0.005***	 -0.006***	 -0.001	
	 	 (-9.28)	 (-4.81)	 (-0.54)	
CashSize	 	 -0.036***	 0.023	 -0.041***	
	 	 (-5.44)	 (1.24)	 (-3.04)	
R&D	 	 0.106***	 0.095*	 0.089**	
	 	 (5.95)	 (1.77)	 (2.14)	
Lev	 	 0.029***	 0.035***	 0.015	
	 	 (6.15)	 (2.78)	 (1.04)	
SalesGrowth	 	 0.146***	 0.174***	 0.080***	
	 	 (26.89)	 (10.13)	 (6.01)	
CapInt	 	 0.007	 0.006	 -0.010	
	 	 (1.46)	 (0.64)	 (-0.93)	
InvInt	 	 -0.032***	 -0.061***	 -0.020	
	 	 (-3.70)	 (-4.35)	 (-0.79)	
FirmAge	 	 0.001***	 0.002***	 -0.002***	
	 	 (4.49)	 (3.56)	 (-3.29)	
Multi	 	 0.041***	 0.042***	 0.051***	
	 	 (12.60)	 (3.15)	 (3.82)	
Country-level controls:	 	 	 	 	
BTaxC	 	 -8.064***	 -8.402***	 -0.968	
 	 	 (-31.79)	 (-4.99)	 (-0.46)	
WW	 	 -0.044***	 0.027	 -0.095**	
 	 	 (-16.34)	 (1.63)	 (-2.03)	
TaxEnf	 	 -0.029***	 -0.025***	 -0.033	
 	 	 (-17.83)	 (-2.73)	 (-1.30)	
TaxRate	 	 0.004	 -0.335***	 0.732***	
 	 	 (0.28)	 (-3.54)	 (4.20)	
VarComp	 	 0.192***	 0.089*	 0.199***	
 	 	 (20.09)	 (1.66)	 (2.64)	
Earnvol	 	 -0.012	 0.279***	 -0.158**	
 	 	 (-1.56)	 (4.29)	 (-2.40)	
Legal factor	 	 -0.010**	 -0.008	 -0.024***	
47	
	
 	 	 (-2.42)	 (-1.53)	 (-3.39)	
	 	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country dummies	 	 No	 No	 No	
Obs.	 	 57,044	 37,887	 19,157	
Adj. R2	 	 0.24	 0.21	 0.26	
 
The table presents OLS regression results with the dependent variable representing the extent of tax avoidance. 
“Group”, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a business group, and 0 otherwise. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by country and year (Petersen, 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 
Excluding Japan 
 
	
Full Sample	 Developed Market	 	
Developed Market/Code 
Law Countries Excluding 
Japan	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 	 (5)	 (6)	
Group	 -0.001	 	 0.002	 	 	 0.013***	 	
	 (-0.55)	 	 (0.70)	 	 	 (4.10)	 	
Large Group	 	 0.003	 	 0.003	 	 	 0.014**	
	 	 (0.94)	 	 (0.67)	 	 	 (2.28)	
Firm-level controls:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Dual	 0.012**	 0.009	 0.008	 -0.001	 	 -0.026***	 -0.044***	
	 (2.14)	 (1.17)	 (0.80)	 (-0.09)	 	 (-2.96)	 (-3.83)	
FamilyFirm	 -0.017***	 -0.016***	 -0.018**	 -0.003	 	 -0.009*	 0.003	
	 (-4.90)	 (-2.89)	 (-2.38)	 (-0.22)	 	 (-1.75)	 (0.27)	
Pre-Tax ROA	 0.124***	 0.147***	 0.104***	 0.084**	 	 0.039	 0.027	
	 (8.81)	 (7.01)	 (4.33)	 (2.37)	 	 (1.38)	 (0.55)	
Size	 -0.003***	 -0.004***	 -0.004***	 -0.005	 	 -0.006***	 -0.007***	
	 (-5.29)	 (-4.56)	 (-3.00)	 (-0.76)	 	 (-5.17)	 (-3.76)	
CashSize	 0.007	 0.013	 0.039***	 0.083***	 	 0.027**	 0.037	
	 (0.96)	 (1.29)	 (3.33)	 (4.99)	 	 (1.97)	 (1.50)	
R&D	 0.044**	 0.074***	 -0.088**	 -0.050	 	 -0.020	 0.081	
	 (2.57)	 (2.74)	 (-2.42)	 (-0.76)	 	 (-0.60)	 (0.86)	
Lev	 0.022***	 0.017**	 0.017**	 -0.002	 	 0.014	 -0.009	
	 (4.40)	 (2.31)	 (2.24)	 (-0.16)	 	 (1.40)	 (-0.54)	
SalesGrowth	 0.099***	 0.100***	 0.100***	 0.104***	 	 0.102***	 0.127***	
	 (18.67)	 (12.66)	 (10.91)	 (8.21)	 	 (8.72)	 (6.30)	
CapInt	 0.009*	 -0.008	 0.025***	 0.008	 	 0.014	 -0.037**	
	 (1.90)	 (-1.25)	 (3.99)	 (0.820	 	 (1.46)	 (-2.37)	
InvInt	 -0.043***	 -0.072***	 -0.049***	 -0.072***	 	 -0.072***	 -0.113***	
	 (-5.00)	 (-5.62)	 (-4.57)	 (-4.75)	 	 (-4.39)	 (-4.07)	
FirmAge	 -0.001***	 -0.000	 -0.001***	 -0.001	 	 0.000	 0.002***	
	 (-3.54)	 (-0.66)	 (-2.99)	 (-1.07)	 	 (0.50)	 (3.44)	
Multi	 0.025***	 0.29***	 0.036***	 0.036***	 	 0.135***	 0.142***	
	 (7.48)	 (5.96)	 (3.05)	 (3.30)	 	 (17.84)	 (11.58)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Obs.	 49,313	 	 23,688	 	 	 13,367	 4,494	
Adj. R2	 0.21	 	 0.20	 	 	 0.16	 0.19	
 
The table presents OLS regression results with the dependent variable representing the extent of tax avoidance. “Group”, is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a business group, and 0 otherwise. “Large Group”, is an indicator 
variable set equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a business group with more than three firms, and 0 otherwise. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by country and 
year (Petersen, 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
The effect of business group affiliation on corporate tax avoidance: 
Within group analysis 
 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
Ultimate owners’ direct ownership	 -1.599**	 	 	
	 (-2.47)	 	 	
PctForeignSales	 	 -0.034**	 	
	 	 (-8.42)	 	
Vertical	 	 	 0.004	
	 	 	 (1.11)	
	 	 	 	
Firm-level controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Obs.	 19,616	 21,410	 16,381	
Adj. R2	 0.19	 0.13	 0.26	
 
 
Panel B: Emerging versus developed markets 
	 Developed 
Market	
Emerging 
Market	
Developed 
Market	
Emerging 
Market	
Developed 
Market	
Emerging 
Market	
Ultimate owners’ 
direct ownership 	
-0.015	 -2.401**	 	 	 	 	
(-1.22)	 (-2.29)	 	 	 	 	
PctForeignSales	 	 	 -0.009	 -0.061***	 	 	
	 	 	 (-0.70)	 (-3.81)	 	 	
Vertical	 	 	 	 	 -0.002	 0.008*	
	 	 	 	 	 (-0.42)	 (1.74)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Firm-level controls	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Country dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Obs.	 11,242	 8,374	 12,670	 8,740	 9,013	 7,368	
Adj. R2	 0.19	 0.25	 0.14	 0.12	 0.22	 0.27	
 
The table presents OLS regression results with the dependent variable representing the extent of tax avoidance. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by country and year (Petersen, 2009). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
